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Personal Service Companies and the Public Sector 
 
Public Sector, Off-payroll workers, tax avoidance, IR35, PSCs  
 
Off-payroll workers, including personal service companies (PSCs) engaged by the 
SXEOLFVHFWRUKDYHWRJLYHµDVVXUDQFH¶RIWKHLUWD[SRVLWLRQIROORZLQJUXOHFKDQJHVLQ
2012.   Departments must be satisfied with the assurance. For PSCs this requires 
awareness of complex tax legislation (IR35), which is aimed at preventing tax avoidance 
by these companies. Costs may be incurred in attaining the necessary knowledge.  This 
may bring into question costs incurred in protecting tax revenue. No similar obligation 
exists in the private sector. 
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1. Introduction and background  
1.1  Introduction 
The UK government has clearly stated its intention to clamp down on tax avoidance.  One 
area thought to offer opportunity for tax avoidance is if organisations (engagers or clients 
henceforth) HQJDJHSHUVRQVµRII-payroll.  Such individuals, not being employees, are 
responsible for their own tax position ± and, in addition ± engagers in such arrangements do 
not have to pay employer National Insurance Contributions (NICs). Media attention in 2012 
(Sparrow, 2012) suggested that some off-payroll workers may pay less tax than those 
employed in the traditional manner.  This is not an issue unique to the UK, but following 
media attention, it was thought to be unacceptable within the public sector. Consequently a 
review of off-payroll engagements was undertaken and new rules for public sector 
departments were introduced in 2012, in an attempt by the government to µput its own house 
LQRUGHU¶. 
The rules introduced require departments  to seek assurance from off-payroll workers that 
their tax position is µcorrect¶; i.e. such workers do not exploit tax avoidance opportunities 
existing as a result of the way in which they work. This may not, however, be 
straightforward, particularly in relation to a form of off-payroll working, where individuals 
work via their own personal service company (PSC) (generally an owner-managed company 
which contracts to provide services to the engager).  This is a common arrangement. Both the 
private and public sector engage the services of PSCs (sometimes referred to as 
µLQWHUPHGLDULHV¶VLQFHWKH\VWDQGEHWZHHQWKHZRUNHU and the engager).  Such arrangements 
have long been the subject of debate in terms of the potential for tax avoidance.  Complex tax 
law, the Intermediaries Legislation (also known as IR35, after a press release of this name) 
exists to target tax advantages that PSCs may gain and departments may need to refer to this 
legislation in seeking assurance of tax positions.  To help with understanding of the 
OHJLVODWLRQGHSDUWPHQWDOVWDIIKDYHDWWHQGHGµPDVWHUFODVVHV¶DQGVRXJKWRWKHUKHOSCosts 
may be incurred both in this respect and in terms of increased administrative responsibilities.  
Perhaps therefore the protection of taxation revenue and the attePSWWRµDYRLGWD[DYRLGDQFH¶ 
comes at additional cost to the taxpayer.  
Interestingly, the obligation WRVHHN³DVVXUDQFH´IURPZRUNHUVRSHUDWLQJYLD36&VGRHs not 
extend to the private sector, hence whilst the same problem exists there are in fact two 
3 
 
different approaches.  It is the PSC arrangement within the public sector upon which this 
paper focuses.  
Importantly, the situation above is the current position (spring 2016).  The budget of March 
2016 proposed that in future, the public sector will determine (rather than simply seek 
assurance of) the tax position of PSCs (HMRC, 2016a), as the suggestion (strongly refuted, 
see for instance Sweet, LVWKDWWKHµLVVXH¶LVPRUHZLGHVSUHDGWKDQ that discussed below.  
The proposals are open to consultation (HMRC, 2016b).  The budget has made no proposal to 
change private sector practices. 
1.2  Background 
Freelancers generated a contribution to the economy of approximately £109 billion in 
turnover in 2015 (Kitching, 2016, p.5). This is a substantial sum.  Such workers will be 
HQJDJHGE\µFOLHQWV¶, to fill temporary positions and skills gaps. Despite this huge 
contribution to the economy, there have, for years, been questions about potential tax savings 
that may be made by those freelancers who operate PSCs, and the Intermediaries Legislation 
exists to combat this.  This legislation has been the subject of various consultations and 
disagreements since its introduction in 2000, with many calling for it to be abolished.  HM 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) have, though, an interest in retaining it. HMRC estimate that 
tax collected is £30m, but that an additional £520m in revenue may be lost without the 
legislation being in place (i.e. it has a protection mechanism).  As total tax at stake is 
therefore £550m and the estimated cost of operating the legislation is £16m, HMRC claims 
there is reason to retain it (HMRC, 2015a). 
Estimates of the number of PSCs vary (around 200,000 according to HMRC (2014, p.135, 
Select Committee evidence volume) and many are engaged as part of the flexible workforce 
in both the public and private sectors.  Indeed, recent pressure, (as discussed in Section 2) to 
reduce costs,  coupled with the policy shift to encourage smaller businesses to supply services 
to the public sector,  has seen decreasing levels of permanent staff in public sector 
employment and increased numbers of temporary staff, agency staff, and contractors etc..  
This is not a new phenomenon. Whether this is a more efficient system or whether costs are 
actually saved is debatable.  This paper addresses not the policy itself but the fact that many 
temporary workers are engaged in the public sector, creating additional obligations (and 
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potentially costs) for departments to obtain assurance about the tax position of certain 
workers. 
This paper explores the reasons for the use of off-payroll workers, with a focus upon tax 
issues arising from the use of PSCs. It illustrates the general difficulties in understanding and 
applying the Intermediaries Legislation, with which the public sector now has to contend. 
The paper is structured as follows:  Section 2 considers the shift in employee status within the 
public sector; Section 3 considers tax issues and the PSC; Section 4 explains how the 
legislation should work, its complexities and opinion on it; Section 5 discusses PSCs and the 
public sector; Section 6 refers to evidence heard at the 2014 Select Committee in respect of 
public sector issues and the final section offers conclusions. 
2. Changing patterns of employment in the public sector 
The media interest of 2012 resulted in a review of off-payroll arrangements.  Sparrow (2012) 
notes that Danny Alexander, Chief Secretary to the Treasury at the time, VDLG³WKHUHYLHZKDG
HVWDEOLVKHGWKDW³RII-SD\UROOHQJDJHPHQW´ KDGEHHQ³endemic in the public sector for too 
PDQ\\HDUV´DQGWKDW in future everyone VKRXOGEHSD\LQJWKHFRUUHFWDPRXQWRIWD[´´.  
Despite these comments, there seems to have been a deliberate policy to reduce permanent 
staff numbers within the public sector in favour of a more flexible workforce. Prior to 
considering the tax issues, a brief review of the literature indicating this sets the context of 
the paper. 
The public sector has been required to cut costs and become more efficient over a number of 
years.  Hartley and Huby (1985, p.23) refer to the Government being FRPPLWWHGWR³«
allowing private contractors to bid in competition with in-KRXVHVXSSOLHUV´ as  there could be 
substantial cost savings and the 1988 Local Government Act  introduced compulsory 
competitive tendering for public bodies (Parker and Hartley, 1990).  Over time, services put 
out to tender, including professional services, increased, (Walsh, 1995).  Corby (2000, p.60) 
UHIHUVWRD³«EOXUULQJRIWKHSXEOLFSULYDWHVHFWRUGLYLGH´ observing the common usage of 
temporary and casual staff and noting ( p.68) the desire by the Labour Government of the 
time to ³PDNHµgreater use of short-term contracts for the civil service¶´.  Morgan and 
Allington (2002, p.36) note WKHGHFOLQHRISHUPDQHQWVWDIIQXPEHUVDQG³«WKHZLGHVSUHDG
use of non-standard forms of HPSOR\PHQW´.  It is also suggested (see e.g. Loader 2011) that, 
as part of government policy, small business is encouraged to take advantage of procurement 
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opportunities within the public sector.  There has therefore been a shift in the employment 
µVWUXFWXUH¶ZLWKLQWKHSXEOLFVHFWRUover a period of time. 
The UK has an expanding sector of temporary, self-employed and freelance workers 
servicing the public (and private) sectors.  Busby and Christie (2005, p.16) note a 
³UHPDUNDEOHJURZWK´ of atypical workers during the 30 years prior to the date of writing 
suggesting this is linked to increases in WKHVHUYLFHVHFWRUDQG³IHPLQLVDWLRQ´RIWKH 
workforce.  Kitching (2015) notes a large expansion in the freelance workforce between 1992 
and 2014.  A number of studies, for example Redston (2004), Chittenden and Sloan (2007), 
Urwin (2011), refer WRµSXVKDQGSXOO¶IDFWRUVZKLFKLQIOXHQFHforms of engagement.  It 
appears there may be DµSXVK¶DZD\IURPHPSOR\PHQWDQGDµSXOO¶WRZDUGVVHOI-employment 
or other ways of working.   
,QUHVSHFWRIµSXVK¶IDFWRUV Urwin (2011) notes that employers may wish to avoid costs 
associated with employment.  Costs include employers national insurance contributions 
(NICs) (a type of payroll tax, not payable when engaging other types of worker, broadly paid 
DWDUDWHRIRIWKHµHDUQLQJV¶VHHVHFWLRQ3(1) of the Social Security Contributions and 
Benefits Act 1992) of each employee above £8,112 per annum (2016/17). There are also 
costs associated with employment protection legislation (Redston, 2004); and other liabilities 
such as pension costs.  
Many µpull¶ factors were mentioned in the 2014 Select Committee evidence. These include 
being RQH¶VRZQERVVIOH[LELOLW\ freedom from employment and variations in the tax system, 
as different rules apply to different ways of working.  
What appears to be evident is that there is a demand for, and a plentiful supply of, off-payroll 
workers who may be engaged in the public sector.  The focus has turned towards the 
perceived tax savings made by such workers although interestingly little mention, if any, has 
been made about the tax (and other) savings (i.e. the µSXVK¶IDFWRrs) to the public sector in 
using these arrangements. 
3. Tax issues and the PSC 
Off-payroll workers are paid by the engager (here the public sector), but, the engager is not 
obliged to pay tax or NICs via the Pay as You Earn (PAYE) system.  The tax position 
remains the responsibility of the worker. However a 2012 BBC Newsnight investigation 
(Sparrow, 2012) into the arrangements of Ed Lester, the then student loans µchief¶ who was 
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HQJDJHGRQDWZR\HDUWHPSRUDU\FRQWUDFWUDWKHUWKDQµRQ-SD\UROO¶and paid though his PSC 
led to (unproven, per Heaton, 2012) allegations of tax avoidance. It was claimed that Mr 
Lester saved himself a substantial amount of tax by using this arrangement.  The fact that this 
was possible appears to have triggered investigations into the working arrangements of those 
engaged µoff-payroll¶ by the public sector, resulting in subsequent changes to procedures.  
Before considering the tax issues of PSCs in further depth it is important to consider how the 
tax system leads to this position.  The tax position differs depending on the status of the 
worker and includes some well-known variations. 
Employees and the self-employed both pay income tax and NICS, yet it is more cost effective 
for HMRC if  people are employed  as tax and NICs are collected via the PAYE system. 
Additionally, the employer has to pay employer NICs.  Different tax rules apply to employees 
and the self-employed; in general, the tax system (both in terms of income tax and NICs) 
favours the self-employed.  At times therefore, the employment µVWDWXV¶RIDQLQGLYLGXDOPD\
come into question.  µ6WDWXV¶ may not be easy to ascertain; it is determined by reliance upon 
case law, which may be difficult to interpret, as discussed in Section 4.  
As an alternative to self-employment, individuals may choose to operate via a limited 
company.  For example, an employee could leave employment on a Friday, set up a company 
and then sell their services (as a contractor/worker) back to their former employer the 
following Monday, doing the same work as previously.  In many cases, a PSC is formed with 
a single share, owned by the director/manager of the company.  The company charges fees 
for services and pays corporation tax and the director decides how and what to pay himself.  
This is usually in the form of part salary and part dividends, which do not carry NICs (for tax 
calculations in this respect, see Heaton, 2012).  
Despite loss of employment rights via this arrangement, a PSC may be cost beneficial for 
both parties.  The former employer is not hindered by employment laws and has no obligation 
to pay NICs or tax via PAYE. The company inserted between the worker and the engager 
prevents the engager from being seen to employ the individual, so the question of 
employment µVWDWXV¶GRHVQRWDULVH  The worker can take a mix of salary and dividend from 
the company, saving tax and NICs.  µ3XVK¶DQGµSXOO¶IDFWRUVDUH relevant.  Comments given 
in evidence at the 2014 Select Committee indicate various reasons as to why one may work 
via a PSC, including; branding opportunities, limited liability, ability to raise finance and ease 
of obtaining work  - the engager may insist on the presence of an intermediary company (to 
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prevent employment status issues arising).  It was also acknowledged that ease and 
inexpensive routes to incorporation (along with past incentives such as the zero percent 
starting rate of corporation tax between Financial Years 2002 and 2005) offer a favourable 
environment for the limited company structure. It may therefore be advantageous from tax 
(and other) perspectives to operate a limited company.  The question is whether disguised 
employment exists",QRWKHUZRUGVLIWKH36&RUµLQWHUPHGLDU\¶ZDVUHPRYHGZRXOGWKHUH
be an employment relationship between the engager and the worker which would not enable 
such advantages?    
The Intermediaries Legislation (IR35) was introduced as anti-avoidance legislation to 
counteract these perceived problems, appearing firstly as Press Release µIR35¶ in 1999, 
legislated via Finance Act 2000 and currently included in the Income Tax (Earnings and 
Pensions) Act 2003, Part 2, Chapter 8 sections 48-61.  It was derived from +05&¶VFRQFHUQ 
DERXWWKHµFriday to 0RQGD\¶ scenario (Freedman, 2001) and the loss of employment rights, 
as stated LQWKH5HYHQXH¶VGLVFXVVLRQGRFXPHQWwhen IR35 was introduced (Oats and Sadler, 
(2011).   John Whiting, Tax Director of the Office of Tax Simplification (OTS) (cited by 
Sweetman, 2014) suggested the intention was to perhaps µSXVK¶LQGLYLGXDOVEDFNXQGHUWKH
umbrella of employment.  This did not occur and in the intervening years the legislation 
appears to have lost sight of the original intent.  A description of the rules follows.  
4. The IR 35 Rules 
In a nutshell, the legislation VWDWHV WKDW LI µORRNLQJ WKURXJK¶ WKH LQWHUPHGLDU\ FRPSDQ\ WKH
relationship would otherwise have been employee/employer, then additional income tax and 
NICs are payable. Unfortunately this is not as simple as it seems. 
A major difficulty is aVFHUWDLQLQJµHPSOR\PHQWVWDWXV¶ which relies upon a large body of case 
law. This is not easy to understand and is open to interpretation, which adds further 
subjectivity to the general problems in interpreting complex tax legislation. (YHQ+05&¶s 
own guidance manual on employment status is described by Freedman (2001, p.8) as being 
³«RYHUZKHOPLQJWRDOOEXWWKHPRVWKDUG\RIOD\SHRSOHDQGWRPDQ\SURIHVVLRQDOVDOVR´. 
Further, IR35 applies not to business sectors, or to one situation, but, on a contract by 
contract basis and contractors may have many contracts over the life of the business 
(Loutzenhiser, 2013a). ,QVKRUWWKHUHLVQRµVLPSOHUXOH¶WRVHHLIWKHOHJLVODWLRQDSSOLHV 
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If it is found to apply, tax and NICs are calculated in a specific way resulting in an increased 
amount payable.  $OWKRXJKWKHµGLVJXLVHGHPSOR\PHQW¶DQGWKHLQWHUPHGLDry company) are 
thereby ignored, no employment rights are granted to the worker. +05&¶V RULJLQDO
proclamations for this legislation are therefore not borne out by the operation of it. Busby 
(2002, p.176) suggests this creates a third category of worker, a ³TXDVL-HPSOR\HH´ Yet the 
responsibility for payment of tax and NICs (and therefore for the operation of the legislation 
in general) rests with the intermediary company, not the engager, and Redston (2009) 
observes that: 
 ³7KRVH ZLWKLQ ,5 WKXV PDNH D JUHDWHU FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH ([FKHTXHU WKDQ D µUHDO¶
employee, because their service companies pay both employer and employee National 
Insurance contributions, but they receive none of the social protection given to regular 
HPSOR\HHV´ 
The original intention had been for the engager to determine if IR35 applied, but amended 
legislation as a result of lobbyists imposed the UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU µJHWWLQJ WKLV ULJKW¶ RQWR
individual workers (Freedman, 2001). It created certainty of position for the engager, but 
confusion and uncertainty for the owner-manager. The engager was effectively absolved from 
responsibilities regarding the worker¶s tax position. This loss of responsibility has now 
shifted slightly with regard to the public sector. It may reverse entirely depending on the 
outcome of the consultations of the budget proposals of March 2016.  
IR35 is a curious mix of employment and tax law, which does not deal with underlying issues 
that were identified at the time of its enactment (such as loss of employment rights).  
Evidence from the 2014 Select Committee indicates that advisors, workers, trade associations 
etc., find IR35 difficult to grasp, describing it as ³FRPSOH[´ ³XQVDWLVIDFWRU\´ DQG
³GLVDSSRLQWLQJ´.   
The legislation has been described as ³WKH FDW-and-PRXVH JDPH´ /RXW]HQKLVHU E
p.406), ³FRQIXVLQJ´ (Freedman, 2001, p.3), ³FDXVLQJ DV PDQ\ SUREOHPV DV LW VHHNV WR
UHVROYH´ /agerberg, 2004, p.269),   KDYLQJ ³XQGHUO\LQJ VWUXFWXUDO LVVXHV´ /HLJKWRQ DQG
Wynn, 2011, p.32), ³«OLWWOH XVHG DQG ³ODUJHO\ µmanaged round¶´´ (OTS), cited in 
Loutzenhiser 2013a, p.44),  ³«DOPRVWLPSRVVLEOHIRUWKH5HYHQXH´ to administer (Oats and 
Sadler, 2011, p.135): and Leighton and Wynn (2011, p.28) noted tensions between the need 
IRU³IUHHGRPRIFRQWUDFW´DQG³LQWHUYHQWLRQLVWWD[UHJLPHV´ 
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Further analysis of the 2014 Select Committee evidence reveals additional illustration of 
opinion on the ground from stakeholders, describing the legislation, for instance as; ³flawed´,  
³costly´,  lacks ³clarity´,  ³burdensome´,  ³LQHIIHFWLYH´and [creates] ³doubt´ [and] ³worry´.  
Nevertheless there were some comments in support, such as; ³appropriate´, ³reduces 
compliance burden´ (of the engager)³ILWIRUSXUSRVH´ and ³ZRUNVYHU\well´.  
Despite the difficulties, it rests with the worker, or their advisor WRµJHWLWULJKW¶.  To do this 
may require consultation of myriad items of HMRC material, serving to illustrate the 
complexities. This includes; news and updates, guidance on employment status, frequently 
asked questions, scenarios, minutes of an IR35 forum (to help with administration) and 
details of HMRC¶V contract review service.  A brief search of the internet shows numerous 
specialist firms offering advice.  There are various organisations assisting contractors, indeed 
one, the Professional Contractors Group (PCG) (now known as The Association of 
Independent Professionals and the Self-Employed (IPSE)) was set up in response to the 
legislation (Freedman, 2001). The PCG fought the legislation (for detailed consideration, see 
Busby, 2002), but having failed; is now involved in discussions representing its members in 
the many debates, and observed at the 2014 Select Committee, that the tax system was 
outdated and needed change to deal with new, flexible ways of working.  
There have been several reviews of the legislation, but dissatisfaction remains, with many 
calling for it to be abolished.  It is a regular topic in the professional press. In 2011, the OTS 
considered IR35 as part of their Small Business Tax Review, making various 
recommendations; the preferred option was to suspend the legislation with a view to 
abolishing it. In 2013 the House of Lords Select Committee was convened to hear evidence 
around the legislation, issuing a report in Spring 2014, followed in June 2014 by the response 
of the government, WKHXSVKRWEHLQJµQRFKDQJH¶.  Another consultation followed in the 
summer of 2015 (HMRC 2015b) and WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHVSRQVHis awaited (Seely, March 
2016).  In addition the government has issued consultation on the March 2016 budget 
proposals (HMRC, 2016b).  It is also of note that the government introduced a new dividend 
tax from 6 April 2016 (HMRC, 2015c) which may affect the tax benefits of operating via a 
company in future. 
Despite the above, the public sector worker now has to provide assurance of tax position and 
departments have to identify whether sufficient assurance is obtained; if they do not, there are 
financial penalties. 7KHµDVVXUDQFH¶UHTXLUHPHQWVDUHGLVFXVVHGbelow. 
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5. PSCs and the Public Sector 
The findings of the review into µRII-SD\UROO¶ZRUNLQJZHUH documented in the 2012 HM 
Treasury ³Review of the tax arrangements of public sector appointees´.  In its Foreword 
Danny Alexander MP indicated there ZDVD³ODFNRIWUDQVSDUHQF\DURXQGWKHWD[
DUUDQJHPHQWVRINH\SXEOLFVHFWRUDSSRLQWHHV´DQGVXJJHVWHGD³WKUHHSURQJHGDSSURDFK´WR
dealing with these issues, whilst trying to avoid increasing administrative burdens. The result 
was to ensure that senior staff are treated as employees (but for exceptional circumstances) 
and for other workers (earning above £220 per day with contracts in excess of 6 months) 
assurance as to their tax position should be sought. The third ³prong´ was in relation to 
monitoring and sanctions for departments. Guidance for departments was contained in 
Procurement Policy Note (PPN) Action Note 07/12, (subsequently amended by PPN Action 
Note 08/15).  The organisations affected are those covered by the Managing Public Money 
(MPM) requirements (HM Treasury guidance against which department spending is audited) 
which states that arrangements to avoid tax are forbidden DV³«DQ\DSSDUHQWVDYLQJVFDQ
only be made at the expense of other tax payers and otKHUSDUWVRIWKHSXEOLFVHFWRU´HM 
Treasury review, p.5) and include central government, NHS Trusts and non- maintained 
schools. Although local government, the BBC and Devolved Administrations were not 
included under the MPM remit; they were instructed to take note of the requirements.  
Off-payroll engagements costing departments more than £58,200 per annum were included in 
the review (p.7).  This identified more than 2,400 engagements, of which 85% were for more 
than 6 months. 5% were senior staff.  In terms of classification, less than 5% were 
individuals, 85% were paid via agencies (some of which may be PSCs, although numbers 
were not identifiable (Alexander, HC Deb, 23 May 2012)) and 10% worked directly through 
PSCs (relatively few).  
For PSCs which cannot demonstrate that all company income derived from the engagement is 
subject to PAYE and NICs, the following rules apply.   
Action Note 07/12 indicated that contractors should produce evidence as to whether they 
were inside or outside the IR35 rules. This required ZRUNHUV³«>to] show that their service 
FRPSDQ\LVORZULVNIRU,5DFFRUGLQJWR+05&¶V³EXVLQHVVHQWLW\´WHVWV´>tests which have 
since been scrapped, see below].  If workers were ³PHGLXPRUKLJKULVN´DFFRUGLQJWRWKH
tests, but believed they were outside the IR35 rules, then assurance would have to be 
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SURYLGHG³LQDGLIIHUHQWZD\´ZLWKWKHVXJJHVWLRQWKDWDFRQWUDFWUHYLHZE\+05&¶VKHOSOLQH
would be sufficient. If the contract were within IR35, evidence was required that IR35 rules 
operate.  The note also indicates: 
³,IWKHGHSDUWPHQWLVQRWVDWLVILHGZLWKWKHHYLGHQFH«they may send details to their CRM 
[Customer Relationship Manager] «to be considered alongside other intelligence to support 
+05&¶VZRUNWRWDFNOHQRQ-FRPSOLDQFH´ 
Action Note 08/15 amended the above after the business entity tests were scrapped, leaving 
as the only options a contract review or evidence that IR35 rules are in operation.  The 
departments¶ responsibilities were also amended, indicating that WKH\³PD\VHHNDGYLFHIURP
their HMRC CRM but «cannot make a referral to HMR&¶V7D[(YDVLRQ+RWOLQHLQOLHXof 
GHFLGLQJLIDZRUNHUKDVSURYLGHGDVVXUDQFH«UHIHUUDOV«DUHWREHPDGHZKHQDZRUNHUKDV
IDLOHGWRSURYLGHDVVXUDQFHDQGWKH'HSDUWPHQWKDVWHUPLQDWHGWKHZRUNHU¶VFRQWUDFWXQOHVV
the worker has already left the Department.´ 
Action Note 08/15 indicated that departments should not accept DFRQWUDFWUHYLHZDWµIDFH
YDOXH¶DVWKH\QHHGWRKDYH³FRQILGHQFHLQWKHUHVXOWVRIDQ\FRQWUDFWUHYLHZ.´A link is 
provided to guidance material on HMRC webpages.  This seems to suggest a reasonable 
working knowledge of this legislation is required. 
The business entity tests (mentioned above) were introduced by HMRC following 
recommendations from the OTS.  These were tests against which workers could score 
themselves to indicate whether they were at high, medium or low risk of an IR35 HMRC 
investigation, but achieving a low risk score did not necessarily mean that IR35 did not apply.  
Following evidence (Hart- Garbett, 2015) that these tests were being used inappropriately 
(contriving answers to derive low scores, for example) and in a manner in which they were 
not intended (Action Note 07/12 perhaps being a case in point); these tests have now been 
removed. 
It is also interesting to note that the BBC has devised its own tests for employment status ± 
ZKLFKKDVDWWUDFWHGFULWLFLVPDVEHDULQJQRUHVHPEODQFHWRWKHµXVXDO¶WHVWVIRUHPSOR\PHQW, 
Contractorcalculator.co.uk (2014). 
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The requirement to obtain assurance of a ZRUNHU¶V tax position has prompted discussion in 
the professional and contracting press, much of it critical.  As indicated at the commencement 
of this paper, many see contractors as being vital to the public sector, offering skills µas and 
when¶ required. PSCs are a legitimate way of working, and Chris Bryce of the PCG warned 
DJDLQVWD³ZLWFKKXQW´E\WKHPHGLDDQGFDOOHGIRUOLPLWVWR³K\VWHULD´ (Contractor UK, 
2012a). The new UXOHVKDYHEHHQGHVFULEHGDVD³VOHGJHKDPPHUWRFUDFNDQXW´$QG\
&KDPEHUODLQRI,36(TXRWHGLQ&RQWUDFWRUFDOFXODWRUFRXNDQG³«DQH[WUDRUGLQDU\
UHDFWLRQWRDEDUHO\UHFRJQLVDEOHSUREOHP´ (Stuart Davis, chairman of the Freelance and 
Contractor Services Association (FCSA) in Contractor UK, 2012b). It is also suggested that 
taxpayer value has in fact been undermined by these rules (Kelly, 2012) (as NICs and pension 
contributions will be payable in respect of senior staff now treated as employees).  
Given the complexities, it is perhaps not surprising to find departments accused, by the 
contracting press, of being µRYHU]HDORXV¶ in applying the rules and there being a lack of 
consistency between departments (Cottrell (n.d.)).  Additionally, Contractorcalculator.co.uk 
(2013) cites opinion suggesting some contractors had ceased working in the public sector.  
Nevertheless a review of all off-payroll workers in March 2015, suggested that 96% were in 
fact compliant with the relevant rules (HM Treasury, 2015). 
The public sector remit re tax compliance activities continues to expand, as further initiatives 
have followed.  For example, since 2013, in order to obtain business via the public sector, 
potential suppliers have been required to certify aspects of their own tax compliance activities 
(PPN Action Note 04/13, (as subsequently amended by PPN Action Note 03/14)).   
6. Select Committee Evidence re the Public Sector 
The Select Committee on Personal Service Companies was set up in 2013, chaired by 
Baroness Noakes. Its terms of reference were to consider the consequences of the use of 
PSCs for tax collection. One of the specific questions for consideration related to the use of 
PSCs in the public sector. Evidence was called for and received from a number of interested 
parties.   
Some evidence confirmed the general problems above. The BBC noted problems with 
identifying employment status and the difficulties of relying on case law and indicated the 
need for clearer guidance from HMRC.  They remarked that; ³This places an increasing 
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compliance burden on any organisation requiring support from a flexible workforce, as the 
responsibility for the misclassification of employment status falls directly against the 
engager.´  There had been a practice of engaging a flexible workforce through PSCs at the 
BBC (avoiding employment status issues for them); although as new employment tests have 
been agreed with HMRC, this practice is no longer necessary.  The Department of Health and 
Local Government Association noted the requirement for µWUDLQLQJ¶about IR35 and indicated 
µPDVWHU classes¶ were available to help them comply with the Treasury requirements, which 
they thought, aided understanding.  
Other comments from stakeholders extracted from the evidence included; ³ILDVFR´³FRPSOHWH
lack of consistency across departments´ ³ZLGHVSUHDGFRQIXVLRQ´ ³FRPSOH[´³difficult to 
interpret and implement´The FCSA had experience RI³public sector organisations 
completely misunderstanding ZKDW³UHTXLUHGDVVXUDQFH´ UHTXLUHVLQYROYHV´. Nevertheless, the 
evidence revealed that guidance about implementing the new provisions was improving with 
time. 
Care UK, a health and social care provider, was FRQFHUQHGWKDWDUHVWULFWLRQRQ36&V³IRU
KLJKO\VNLOOHG*3VDQGFRQVXOWDQWVZRXOGEHGHWULPHQWDOWRILOOLQJVKLIWV«´ Others giving 
evidence supported the use of a flexible workforce to fill a skills gap. Concerns were raised 
about the cost of adding individuals to the payroll in terms of NICs and employment 
protection legislation.  
7.  Conclusion  
Operating a PSC is a common arrangement for flexible workers whose services continue to 
be in demand. The Intermediaries Legislation (IR35) however is not easy to apply given its 
links with employment law and tests of status which are reliant on case law.  The insertion of 
a company between the engager and worker removes uncertainty of employment status for 
the engager; hence in the private sector engagers are generally happy with the legislation as it 
stands.  The public sector however now has to seek assurance from workers that their tax 
position is correct.  But it can be difficult for a worker be certain of their position in relation 
to these rules; and opinion may need to be sought, for each contract, via a contract review 
service, in order to provide assurance required. 
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The rationale behind the requirements is acknowledged, yet even those who describe 
WKHPVHOYHVDVµH[SHUWV¶DUHRIWHQOHIWXncertain whether a contract is clearly caught by IR35, 
as evidenced in comments made to the Select Committee.  The complex legislation makes 
certainty difficult as highlighted by both academic commentators such as Freedman (2001) 
and Loutzenhiser (2013) and the contracting press, for instance Contractorcalculator and 
Contractor UK. 
The lengths to which public sector departments have had to go to get to grips with this 
OHJLVODWLRQHJDWWHQGLQJPDVWHUFODVVHVDQGQRWDFFHSWLQJDVVXUDQFHVDWµIDFHYDOXH¶) suggest 
potentially high compliance costs.  The numbers of affected companies are not particularly 
clear (there could be relatively few), but despite this, given the issues discussed, one could 
question the net benefit derived for the taxpayer.   Additional research may be required to 
ascertain the costs of these measures and views from the public sector could be sought.   The 
continued use of IR35 legislation in its current form has been called into question many 
times, but it seems to have become an intractable problem.  Despite the expense of numerous 
consultations and debates, there have been no significant changes to the legislation in its 17 
year history.  Whether changes occur from the summer 2015 consultation and/or the 
consultation of the March 2016 budget proposals remain to be seen.  In the meantime, the 
need to confirm employment status is particularly onerous for the public sector and while the 
costs of implementation remain largely hidden, it is likely that IR35 will remain a burden for 
the foreseeable future.  
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